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Abstract
This Article begins with the puzzle of why law does not embrace the
“product rule”; a mathematically-inclined judge or jury that thought a defendant
.6 likely to have been negligent and .7 likely to have caused plaintiff’s harm might
conclude that plaintiff had failed to satisfy the preponderance of the evidence
standard.  Following some discussion of a number of reactions to this puzzle, the
Article advances the idea that the process of aggregating multiple jurors’
assessments overlooks valuable information.  First, following the Condorcet Jury
Theorem,  agreement among jurors might raise our level of confidence beyond
what the jurors themselves report.  Second, a supermajority’s mean or median
voter is likely to have a different assessment from that gained from the marginal
juror.  As such, a supermajority (or unanimity) rule may take the place of the
product rule where there are multiple  requirements for liability or guilt.  An
attempt to extract this inframarginal information more directly would likely
generate strategic behavior problems.  The analysis is extended to panels of judges,
for whom outcome voting may (somewhat similarly) substitute for the product
rule.
* * * * * * *
This Article begins with a significant theoretical problem, sometimes
referred to as the question of conjunctive probability, or as the proper use
of the product rule.  It is a problem in the sense that legal practice seems at
1  Edward J. Devitt, Charles B. Blackmar, & Michael A. Wolff, Federal Jury Practice and
Instructions, Civil § 80.17  (4th ed. 1987).  Nearly identical language is used in actual cases.  See , e.g.,
Folks v. Kirby Forest Ind. Inc., 10 F.3d 1173, 1176 (1994) (reversed and remanded on o ther grounds).
There is some variety across states, as the elements of a tort claim might be described as two or three
or even one in number.  Thus, in Alabama: “The plaintiff claims the defendant was negligent and that
his negligence proximately caused certain injuries suffered by the plaintiff… This presents for your
determination the following.  Was the defendant negligent as claimed by the plaintiff?  If so, was such
negligence of the defendant the proximate cause of any injury sustained by the plaintiff as claimed?
If you find both of the above issues in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant what sum of
money will fairly and reasonably compensate him for the injury so sustained?  Alabama Pattern Jury
Instructions, Civil 21.01.  But in Colorado: "For the plaintiff to recover from the defendant on his
odds with scientific logic, or at least with probabilistic reasoning.  Although
this problem must arise quite frequently, it is one that is unfamiliar to most
lawyers and (even) legal scholars, and it is one that is ignored by most
litigants and judges.  I draw on public choice theory, loosely defined, to
offer some solutions to this problem.  Moreover, these solutions may prove
useful in understanding the character of factfinding and decisionmaking by
a jury or other group.
I.   The Conjunction Problem
A.   Law’s Suppression of the Product Rule
Consider the straightforward problem of combining two judgments
or estimates about two or more elements of interest to law.  If, for example,
the law holds A liable to B when A is negligent and when this negligence
can be said to have (proximately) caused B’s injury, a factfinder must
evaluate the likelihood of A’s negligence and the likelihood of the
necessary causal link between this negligent behavior and B’s injury.  An
illustrative jury instruction is as follows:  “In order to prove the essential
elements of plaintiff's claim, the burden is on the plaintiff to establish, by a
preponderance of the evidence in the case, the following facts:  First, that
the defendant was negligent in one or more of the particulars alleged; and
Second, that the defendant's negligence was a proximate cause of some
injury and consequent damages sustained by the plaintiff.1” Quite
claim of negligence, you must find that all of the following have been proved by a preponderance of
the evidence: 1.  The plaintiff had injuries; 2 . The defendant was negligent; and 3. The defendant's
negligence was a cause of the plaintiff's injuries.  If you find that any one or more of these three
statements had not been proved, then your verdict must be for the defendant.  On the other hand, if you
find that all of these three statements have been proved, then your verdict must be for the plaintiff."
CJI-Civ. 4th 9:1  Oregon expresses the ideas of negligence and causation almost as if these were a
single element: "To recover, the pla intiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
defendant was negligent in at least one respect charged in the plaintiff's complaint which was a cause
of damage to the plaintiff…"  UCJI No. 20.01.
Some states are more ambiguous in their treatment of the product rule.  For example, Florida's
standard jury instructions read, "The issues for your determination on the claim of (claimant) against
(defendant) are: whether (defendant) was negligent in (describe negligence); and, if so, whether such
negligence was a legal cause of injury sustained by claimant.  If the greater weight of the evidence
does not support the claim of (claimant), then your verdict should be for (defendant)."  Fla. Std. Jury
Instr. (Civil) 3.5, pp. 1c, 2; 3.6; 3.7.  Although this instruction is somewhat ambiguous on whether the
weight of the evidence must support the entire claim or individual issues, Florida and other states with
similar jury instructions seem to suppress the product rule as well.
Instructions might also be given regarding the meaning of the preponderance standard, of
negligence, and so forth.  Even where judges are inclined to roll everything they wish to communicate
into one (ambiguous) sentence, the jury may return with questions as to how to combine its findings.
As will become clear, there are many ways to try and avoid  the conjunction problem, but I prefer in
this Article to show that the apparent illogic of the law may actually be clever in light of aggregation
problems.
2  Lewis A. Grossman & Robert G. Vaughn, A Documentary Companion to ‘A Civil Action’
626 (1999) (jury instructions).
generally, juries are told that the “essential question is whether the
evidence taken as a whole, both direct and circumstantial, establishes every
element of the plaintiffs’ case by a preponderance of the evidence.2”
Imagine now that the factfinding generates a conclusion that there is
a .7 chance of negligence and .6 chance of causation.  Doctrinally, the law
seems to require that A pay if and only if A is negligent and causes B’s
harm.  The question is whether this “and” is conjunctive.  Most people who
are experienced in probabilistic thinking hurry to say that the logic of the
law seems to be that A should be liable if A is both negligent and the causal
agent, and that this combined probability is (.7)(.6) = .42.  In turn, the
preponderance of the evidence (POE) standard is normally thought to
mean that plaintiff is entitled to collect if his case is weightier than it would
3  The “product” or multiplication rule applies whenever two events are independent.  Thus,
there is a .25 chance of seeing two heads in a row when a fair coin is tossed, because for each coin the
probability of a head is .5 and (.5)(.5) = .25.  Independence, prior probabilities, and other nuances are
taken up presently.
4  Note that this is not merely a behavioral anomaly, which is to say an error we can expect
of earnest but imperfect factfinders, because we instruct the jury to proceed according to the lawyers’
rather than the mathematicians’ intuitions.  Thus, these factfinders might suffer from hindsight bias
(which might sway them in favor of an injured victim, for example) but we hardly encourage or
instruct them to make this error.
be in equipoise, which is to say plaintiff’s case is more likely than not.  The
product of the two probabilities, or likelihood of these two events, is thus
less than the .5 hurdle established by the POE rule normally thought
applicable to civil cases.3
In contrast, most lawyers who have thought about this subject
regard the (representative) jury instructions as calling for liability on
defendant’s part in this case because plaintiff apparently satisfies the first
requirement (inasmuch as .7 exceeds the .5 trigger established by the
preponderance rule), and then also satisfies the second requirement set out
by the law.  At the risk of oversimplification, the problem is that the
mathematics of the matter tells us to multiply the two probabilities,
following what is known as the multiplication rule (for combining
independent probabilistic assessments), or more commonly the “product
rule.”  Law appears not to abide by this rule.  I will refer to this puzzle, if it
is that, as the “math-law divide.4”
B.   Reactions to the Math-Law Divide
There are a number of conventional reactions to, and observations
about, this problem, if I may call it that.  None is entirely satisfactory, I
think, but all bear mention.  In any event, I warrant that the reader will
regard these reactions a bit more skeptically after thinking about the
aggregation issues that form the core of the new reaction to the math-law
divide offered in Part II.
5  See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal
Process, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 1329 (1971)
1.  Misuse of Probabilities
One reaction is that factfinders, and especially lay juries, are likely to
misuse instructions about probabilities.5  This point is sometimes made in
association with the observation that the product rule applies where the
events are independent, and the elements and evidence considered in
courts are often interdependent – and more difficult to combine.  That
interdependence changes the way we ought to combine probabilities is
obvious; the chance of flipping three heads in a row with a fair coin is
(.5)(.5)(.5) = .125; it is expected to occur once in eight times.  But if I know
that the coin is weighted so that it will always come out the same, I need
only flip it once to see whether it is weighted one way or the other.  Now
the tosses are completely interdependent and the probability of three
consecutive heads (or tails) is .5.  If factfinders are given multiple
requirements for liability, and these requirements are highly
interdependent, then a blanket instruction to apply the product rule would
seriously underdeter defendants and undercompensate plaintiffs
compared to the ideal set out by law.  To take an extreme case, if
factfinders assess the likelihood of defendant’s negligence in a case by
defendant’s demeanor as a witness, then it is quite likely that a comparable
assessment of the causation requirement amounts to drawing the same
conclusion twice in a way that makes the estimates highly interdependent.
The misuse point is often associated with a famous case in criminal
law in which the prosecutor at trial emphasized certain facts (modified
here for expository purposes) and encouraged conclusions based on the
product rule.  The prosecutor stressed that the defendants’ appearances
matched eyewitness reports of a perpetrator’s hair color (blond), hair style
(pony tail), companion’s race (black), automobile color (yellow), and so
6  People v. Collins, 438 P.2d 33 (1968) (concluding that defendant should  not have had  his
guilt determined “by the odds,” where prosecutor misapplied the product rule in remarkable fashion).
The case is discussed in Maya Bar-Hillel, Probabilistic Analysis in Legal Factfinding, 56 Acta
Psychologica 267, 268-70 (1984); Tribe, supra note 5, at 1341-42.
forth.6  If each characteristic were a 1 in 10 possibility, and the defendant
presents a match for four such features, the prosecutor or expert witness is
tempted to say that there is but a (.1)(.1)(.1)(.1), or only a one in ten-
thousand chance that the defendant is not the perpetrator.
But this application of the product rule is normally absurd.  In the
first place it suffers from an ex post flaw, amounting to a serious sort of
selection bias.  The one in ten thousand claim might be appropriate where a
witness had described these four traits, and then a perpetrator was arrested
somewhere else, perhaps after committing a similar crime, and the
question was whether the arrested person might also be responsible for the
first crime.  But where the police pick up a suspect because this suspect
matches the characteristics reported by a witness, the product rule tells us
very little.  The police have searched the population for someone who
presents the four traits, and it now adds no extra information to find out
that these traits are fairly unlikely to be present in any one randomly
drawn person.  It might be useful to know how likely it was that an
individual (not randomly) selected by the police had no alibi for a given
time, or how large the local population was (so that the police could not
look across hundred of millions of people to find the one in ten thousand
combination), but without this sort of information multiplying chances
leads only to misconceptions.
The independence of the events in question is also at stake (though
less dramatically) to the extent that blond hair is more likely than other
colored hair to be in pony tails, or blond-haired persons are more likely to
drive yellow cars.  If these links are not random, then the events are not
independent (though likely to multiply out to a large denominator
anyway).
I set aside this reaction to the puzzle of the math-law divide because
it is unlikely that some actual or potential misuse of the product rule
explains why it is avoided entirely in every setting.  The preferred reaction
to misapplication of a tool is normally to educate lawyers and even jurors
in order to reduce this misuse.  Moreover, in the criminal context we
hesitate to convict when there is fear of bias or misused evidence, but it is
hard to see why this tilt toward individual liberty would lead law to prefer
that A pay B in a civil case, even though it was more likely than not that A
was not both negligent and the cause of B’s injury.  If anything, the
suppression of the product rule in criminal law might be understood to
follow from the possibility of misuse of probabilistic evidence and
reasoning along with a disinclination to intervene and do more harm than
good.  Following this approach, we might expect a bias in civil law against
recovery – which would normally mean an inclination in favor of the
product rule, inasmuch as it reduces fractional numbers through
multiplication.
The product rule could often be used in favor of plaintiffs but courts
and litigants have not recognized the necessary arguments.  Imagine, for
example, a plaintiff in a products liability suit who should win if she can
show that defendant’s product was defectively designed (D), defectively
manufactured (M), or sold with an inadequate warning (W).  Here the
multiple requirements are not to be conjoined because they are alternative
routes to success.  If plaintiff can show only that each claim is but .4 likely
to be true, the lawyer expects plaintiff to lose – but the product rule
suggests that plaintiff should win.  There is, after all,  a .6 chance that
defendant did not produce a defective design, D, and similarly a .6 chance
of not-M.  If D and M are independent, then there is a .36 chance that
defendant was well behaved with respect to both design and manufacture.
The possibility of W, a third route for plaintiff, further reduces the
likelihood (to .216) that defendant should be absolved; with three such
routes, it is quite likely that we err by requiring plaintiff to satisfy the
7  Unfortunately, the court that has come closest to recognizing this issue of reverse
conjunction, failed to grasp the full power of the pro-plaintiff argument.  See Cheshire Med. Ctr. v.
W.R. Grace & Co., 49 F.3d 26 (1 st Cir. 1995) (acknowledging the product rule issue but by focusing
on plaintiff’s burden rather than the conjoined  likelihood of defendant’s avoiding all alternative claims
missing the applicability of the  product rule). 
8  In the torts setting the idea is that absent the defendant’s misstep, the chance that plaintiff
would have been injured is very low.   “The more serious the breach of duty and the less the amount
preponderance standard for at least one alternative on its own.  In this
example, conjunction issues arise where there are not multiple
requirements but alternative routes for a decision; the plaintiff’s
alternatives amount to the presence of multiple requirements (and
conjunction) for defendant to succeed.7   I will return to this “reverse
conjunction” problem below.  It presents no special difficulty for the theory
advanced here.
2.   More on Independence
A second reaction to the law’s disinclination to use the product rule
focuses on the likelihood that A’s negligence and A’s causal connection are
not likely to be perfectly independent of one another.  If, of course, they are
completely dependent and the factfinder thinks that each is still .6 likely,
then .6 rather than .36 is our best assessment of the likelihood that A
satisfies the two requirements for liability.  If, for example, B claims that
pharmaceutical company A’s nondisclosure caused B’s allergic reaction,
then it may well be that causation and negligence are virtually the same
question.  If A’s drug has the side-effect that B asserts, then the factfinder
might well conclude that A was negligent not to have warned of it, and the
same inquiry is likely to drive the causation assessment.  Moreover, there
are some classes of cases – but only some –  in which a greater likelihood of
one requirement (such as negligence) does imply a greater likelihood of the
other (such as causation) if only because it becomes less likely that the
plaintiff would have suffered the injury if defendant had avoided its failure
as to the first requirement.8 
of unavoidable accident, the less proof that should be required of the plaintiff on the cause in fact
issue.”  Mark F. Grady, Cases and Materials on Torts 567 (1994).
9  Thus, if a jury thinks that defendant was negligent it is sensible for it to ask whether given
defendant’s negligence and given plaintiff’s injury, it is more likely than not that the defendant’s
negligence caused the plaintiff’s injury.  This sort of argument is developed in A.P. Dawid, The
Difficulty About Conjunction, 36 The Statistician 91 (1987).
10  Ronald J. Allen, A Reconceptualization of Civil Trials, 66 B.U. L. Rev. 401 (1986).
This reaction is most convincing if factfinders are incapable of
following instructions regarding interdependent and independent events.
It may be that where elements are independent, factfinders allow their
view of one element to influence their assessment of another.  But even so,
if there is so much interdependence between two requirements for a
decision, that we are better off not multiplying the factfinder’s estimates,
then it often follows that there is little need to have the second requirement
in the first place.  If the connection between two requirements is nearly
perfect, so that whenever there is negligence there is also causation, for
instance, then the law need only ask whether it is more likely than not that
there has been negligence.  Generally speaking, if it is worthwhile to ask
multiple questions, then logic or math suggests that we do better applying
the product rule – though we need to be careful about independence and
conditional probabilities.9  But such generalizations may be beside the
point because we can instruct the factfinder(s) not only about multiple
requirements and the product rule but also about the necessary
modifications if the same factfinder deems the requirements to be
somewhat interdependent.
3.   Probabilities and Competing Stories
A third reaction shifts the ground of the inquiry a bit and insists that
regardless of details like jury instructions, the fundamental task of a trial
(at least in adversarial systems) is to pose two competing stories in order
for a factfinder to say which is more likely to be true.10  B tells a story about
11  Mark F. Grady, Untaken Precautions, 18 J. Legal Stud. 139 (1989).
12  Of course, this is not quite true.  If one story has two elements assessed at .9 and .4, then
that story is more likely than a competing story with two elements assessed as .51 and .52, although
the second story satisfies an instruction or intuition that what matters is not the product (which is to
say the correct combination of the two probabilities attached to independent events) but the fact that
each element meets the PO E test.
his injury, and A then responds with a claim that B’s injury must have
come from C (rather than A) or that A could not have been negligent
because A took a set of precautions, and so forth.  It is sometimes said that
every successful tort claim has the plaintiff describe an untaken precaution
that the defendant should have taken.11  Presumably, the defendant then
disputes this claim or, at least, the causal connection between the untaken
precaution and the given plaintiff’s injury.  In any event, the more we
imagine the factfinder to be comparing two stories, the less it matters
whether the factfinder multiplies probabilities.  We might even say that the
factfinder sees several elements to plaintiff’s story and several
encapsulated in the defendant’s story, and that it does not normally matter
whether the factfinder behaves like a mathematician in evaluating both – or
unlike a mathematician in both.12
There is much to be said for this reaction, though perhaps more in
some areas of law than others.  Empirical evidence about factfinding is
necessary to evaluate the claim.  Imagine, for example, that plaintiff’s
“story,” X, involves two elements, assessed as being .7 and .6 likely to have
occurred or to have been satisfied.  If defendant tells a story that is .3 likely,
this approach suggests that we move our attention away from the fact that
the plaintiff’s story is .42 likely, so to speak, and look instead at the fact that
.42 is greater than .3.  So far so good.  But what if the defendant says that
what happened was not X, as the plaintiff claims, but rather either Y or Z.  Is
defendant really required to choose one possible story?  The combined
likelihood of either Y or Z might be more than .42.  In short, I have little
doubt but that successful litigants weave stories and artfully compare their
13  Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgments of and by Representativeness, in Daniel
Kahneman, Paul Slovic, & Amos Tversky, eds., Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases
91-96 (1982). 
stories with those produced by adversaries, but this way of thinking
resolves the puzzle of the math-law divide only if we somehow think that
law insists that each side simplify its argument in this way.  And, again,
even if we compare the best story on one side with the best mustered on
the other (so that arguments in the alternative are deeply discounted), the
product rule might be helpful as it operates within a single story.  A
mathematician might choose a different winner than most uninstructed lay
(or legally trained) factfinders, if these factfinders are told only that
plaintiff’s side overcomes its burden of proof if and only if it shows that
each of two requirements is more likely than not to have been met in its
winning story. 
Rational actors aside, the “competing stories” approach is easily
linked to the interesting psychology literature which suggests that, quite
apart from any problem with numbers or math, people have difficulty
thinking logically about conjunctive probabilities.13  Thus, when told a
story about “Bill,” subjects regularly assessed the likelihood that Bill was
an accountant who played jazz as greater than the likelihood that Bill was
an accountant; these very subjects agreed later that if Bill had two
characteristics, then he surely had one of these, so that it was at least as
likely that Bill was an accountant as that Bill was both an accountant and a
jazz person.  It appears that the compound story of Bill as an accountant
who plays jazz for a hobby is more appealing, if that is the right word, than
the story of Bill as a mere accountant or jazz hobbyist.
In these studies, subjects were not asked  to generate numerical
assessments but rather to rank the likelihood of various stories or
characteristics (including both compound and single ones), so that we do
not know whether the conjoining error they made involved underestimates
of the likelihood of the single characteristic or overestimates of the
compound characteristics.  It is difficult, therefore, to take from these
studies any easy conclusions about law.  It is possible that factfinders
seriously overestimate conjoined events, because the entire story is
somehow more appealing, and that law does nothing to offset this either
because lawmakers suffer from the same psychological bias or because
lawmakers think there is no point in fighting human nature.  But it is also
possible that factfinders generate decent assessments of multiple events
and simply underestimate single events that are not embedded in complete
and appealing stories. 
4.   Other Aims of Law
Yet another reaction is to begin with the intuition that not all
applications of the product rule are alike.  If the factfinder assesses the
likelihood of defendant’s negligence as .8, and the likelihood of this
negligence as having caused plaintiff’s injury as .6, some observers (and
perhaps jurors and judges) will be comfortable with a decision in favor of
liability because of the intuition that making negligent parties pay “too
much” is harmless or even healthy.  I should rush to add that other
observers, and for all we know other factfinders, are likely to focus
elsewhere, tilting toward liability, perhaps, when there is a high likelihood
of causation even though the  negligence requirement is not quite met, or
the product rule leaves us below the POE point.  This latter view is
consistent with a preference for strict liability and with a bit of imagination
it is encouraged by a preference for partial or probabilistic recoveries as
well.   
Somewhat similarly, if one worries that jurors suffer from hindsight
bias and overestimate the likelihood of negligence, say, because the known
injured victim biases their assessment of the reasonableness of defendant’s
14  Jurors’ inability to perform probabilistic assessments are well known.  See, e.g., Reid
Hastie & W. Kip Viscusi, W hat Juries Can't Do Well: The Jury's Performance as a Risk Manager, 40
Ariz. L. Rev. 901 (1998).
15  In criminal law the defense is given some latitude.  It is conventional for the defense to
remind the jury of all the small doubts that have been raised and to imply that they combine to leave
more than a reasonable doubt.  Unfortunately, the law (once again) suppresses the nature of this
combinatorial process.  It is not surprising that in criminal law we are especially disinclined to attach
real numbers to standards.   The product rule suggests that the jury engage in some multiplication; lay
(statistically unsophisticated) intuitions might be to perform some add ition; a third , reasonable view
might be that at least one of these doubts on its own needs to be substantial enough to meet the
reasonable doubt standard.  After all, if reasonable doubt means that one has a reason for the doubt,
then perhaps a check on this reason is that it not be trivial.  On the other hand, it can be uniquely held.
A jury can acquit even when each juror points to a different reasonable doubt, but there are other
elements that jurors might need to agree upon.  See Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813 (1999)
(holding that in a continuing criminal enterprise case under 21 U.S.C. 848, jurors are required to agree
unanimously not only that accused committed continuing series of violations, but also as to which
specific violations made up the continuing series). I do not pursue these puzzling rules here.
16  For the claim that suppression can (somehow) offset the lack of a partial liability rule, see
Alex Stein, Of Two Wrongs that Make a Right: Two Paradoxes of the Evidence Law and Their
Combined Economic Justification (forthcoming).
earlier behavior, it is tempting to say that suppressing the product rule
might then offset the hindsight bias.14 
One problem with these explanations is that they are quite specific
while the suppression of the product rule is nearly universal, except
perhaps in criminal law.15  Another problem is that it is hard to see how
suppression of the product rule provides an offset of the correct size.  As
such, each of these offset arguments comes as a kind of attachment to the
original puzzle, bearing no particular logical connection to it.16
5.   Objections to Numbers and Probabilities
An important reaction to the puzzle of the math-law divide might
simply be that the puzzle is nothing new but rather another example of
law’s disinclination to ask factfinders specific questions, especially
regarding numbers.  We feel comfortable asking whether something meets
the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, or whether proof in a
17  We ask factfinders to overcome their math anxieties with respect to things other than
damages.  Thus, some jurisdictions impose market share liability where there are “recurring cases,”
and some give recovery for “lost chances.”  See Saul Levmore, Probabilistic Recoveries, Restitution,
and Recurring Wrongs, 19 J. Legal Stud. 691(1990).
18  Following the framing strategy advanced by  Gerd Gigerenzer, The Psychology of Good
Judgment: Frequency Formats and Simple Algorithms, 16 Med. Decision Making 273 (1996)
(discussing the use and accuracy of "fast and frugal algorithms" that help people perceive statistical
or probabilistic relationships).  See also Gerd Gigerenzer & Ulrich Hoffrage, How to Improve
Bayesian Reasoning W ithout Instruction: Frequency Formats, 102 Psychol. Rev. 684 (1995). 
19  We do not want to ask the jury to imagine 100 cases in which there are injuries of the sort
experienced here, followed by the question of how often defendant was negligent (and then how often
in this subset defendant caused the injury) because this encourages hindsight bias of a sort. 
criminal trial is strong enough to eliminate reasonable doubt, but even
these standards are rarely reduced to probabilities or to numerical
guidelines.  Wherever possible, law avoids mathematical tasks. 
A problem with this last generalization is the slipperiness of the
“wherever possible” concept.  We regularly ask juries or judges to engage
in difficult damage assessments, and this produces something of a puzzle
as to why we do not ask these factfinders for precise probabilistic
estimates.17  I will suggest below that, at least in the case of multi-member
juries or panels, we might lose more than we would gain by asking for
numerical assessments.  In contrast, we might have little to lose by asking
for precision where damages are concerned. 
Still, it is fair to wonder how we might instruct juries or judges to
follow the product rule if we wished to do so.  Indeed, what does it mean
to ask any factfinder for a probabilistic assessment of a requirement such as
causation or negligence?
A leading possibility is to express the problem or task in terms of
frequencies18 – although this can be quite difficult to do for most tort
cases.19  Another approach is to translate probabilistic questions into
descriptions of wagers or, perhaps more accurately, wager-like tests for
risk-neutral persons.  If a judge, juror, or legislator were to ask for an
20  This is an important condition because without it jurors will feel encouraged to expand
the number of voters on their own through consultation and the like.  We might encourage jurors to
see themselves as representatives of a large group, but one that is constrained to  work with certain
information.
explanation of the POE rule with respect, say, to causation, it would be fair
to say that the question is whether A “caused” B’s injury, and that if the
evidence leads the decisionmaker to believe that she would be indifferent
as to which side of a wager to take – where the winner of the wager is the
person who correctly predicts how a large panel of voters would regard
the evidence as to causation and would “vote” for or against causation –
then this decisionmaker should say that there is a .5 chance of causation.
The large panel is appealing because of a theorem, discussed presently,
which describes conditions under which the larger the group the more
correct it is likely to be.  Similarly, an assessment of .8 should reflect the
fact that the decisionmaker would give 4-1 odds that a majority of the
hypothetical large group would vote that A caused B’s injury.  The wager
metaphor could no doubt be turned into something real, but the point is
that the metaphor explains the notion of uncertain and probabilistic
assessment.
One weakness of the wager approach is that it requires some
baseline, or idealized conception of the perfect decisionmaker.  We surely
cannot ask a juror or judge to imagine betting on the truth.  After all,
various legal rules will have excluded some relevant evidence.  A problem
with appealing to faith or reason in a large group of voters, who have
heard the same evidence and instructions observed and admitted at trial,20
is that our decisionmaker may comprehend flaws in this approach.  A large
group might exhibit herd behavior or polarization, for example.  There is
surely something awkward about asking a judge (or even a jury) to try and
imitate a mob. 
6.   Taking Matters One at a Time
21  See e.g., Glanville Williams, Mathematics of Proof–II, 1979 Crim. L. R. 340.
22  Note that the same one-at-a-time approach can be taken in “reverse conjunction”cases, so
that the failure to use the product rule now favors defendant.  See supra text accompanying note 7.
Perhaps the simplest reaction to the math-law divide is to deny the
need for any conjunction at all where law is concerned.21  In asking
whether it is more likely than not that two coin tosses will yield two heads
more than one in three times, everyone would agree that  the problem
solver should multiply .5 times .5 to see that the answer is no, for two
heads will materialize but one in four times.  But when the questions are
whether A was more likely than not to have been driving negligently and
whether such driving caused B’s neck injury (where there is some chance
that B has no real injury or a preexisting condition), reasonable people are
comfortable with the idea that if each answer is that it is .6 likely we should
stop there and find A responsible.  We are, perhaps, not looking for the
conjoined probability that both things are true at the same time.22
Put this way, I think we have not so much a reaction to the math-
law divide as a restatement of it.  In any event, there is much more to be
said here, but it is somewhat tangential to the aim of the present Article.
For present purposes, it is simply useful to have at least one coherent – or
even desirable – way for a decisionmaker to assign probabilities to the
likelihood of such things as causation and negligence.  Armed with such
numbers, it becomes possible to multiply them if we deem the product rule
applicable and desirable.  It is even possible that an appreciation of the
difficulties associated with aggregation of individual assessments will
illuminate the nature of an individual decisionmaker’s assessments.  One of
my aims here is to show that once we explore problems of aggregation, we
will not think of conjunction as before.
II.   Aggregation and the Product Rule
23  As far as I can tell, no state encourages simple majority verdicts.  See infra note 32.
A.   Introduction
In American law, at least, the sort of factfinding referred to here is
frequently carried out by juries, often consisting of twelve members and
nearly always instructed to return unanimous or supermajority verdicts.23
Such factfinding requires the aggregation and assesment of (like but not
identical) views.  The arguments offered in this Part show that this manner
of group factfinding is likely to produce probabilistic assessments that
underestimate the numbers, or likelihoods, that the product rule would
have us multiply.  I do not suggest that lawmakers consciously suppress
the product rule in order to compensate for these underassessments;
indeed, there is little reason to think that the great majority of lawmakers
have given any thought whatever to the product rule.  But there is an
interesting connection between aggregation and conjunction, and it might
serve as a kind of explanation, rationalization, or vehicle for understanding
the suppression of the product rule in law. 
A more ambitious conjecture is that the supermajority norm (which
as we will see plays an important role in generating underassessments) is a
reaction to the frequency with which juries deal with cases involving
multiple requirements for liability – where the product rule is most apt.  
In Part III, I turn to cases where juries are not deployed.  First, there
is the obvious question of what we should expect when factfinding is in the
hands of a single judge, so that there are no aggregation issues.   Finally,
the discussion turns to panels of judges.
B.   The Product Rule and the Condorcet Jury Theorem
The Condorcet Jury Theorem tells us that where each voter has
more than an even chance of being right on some matter, then the more
voters we have the closer we get to a probability of 1.0 of getting the matter
right by abiding by a majority vote.  A group, or jury, does better than an
individual (where the assumption rules out the case where the individual is
24  Condorcet’s 1785 work is discussed in Dennis C. Mueller, Constitutional Democracy 158-
59 (1996).  The theorem assumes that there is a “right” answer to the question at hand, that each voter
is equally likely to know the right answer, or at least that each is more likely than not to discern the
correct answer, and that we have no way of identifying those who are most likely to be right or even
likely to benefit from deliberation.  On some issues an expert will obviously do better than a large
well-meaning group of voters, although even there adding in enough more voters, each of whom is
more likely to be right than wrong, will eventually improve the stew.  It is where a non-expert is more
likely to be wrong than right, or where a non-expert does no better than guess, that we most need
experts.
Thus, if only to date this Article, the audience in the television program “Who Wants to be
a Millionaire” offers a remarkably reliable “lifeline” for contestants.  When this audience agrees on
an answer it is rarely wrong.  In the program, there is a “right” answer, there is no way of discerning
experts except that the contestant knows his own doubts and non-expertise, there is no incentive for
the jurors to vote strategically, and the nature of the questions and audience suggests that indeed each
member is more likely than not to be right.
25  Many readers will wish to know how quickly groups converge on the Condorcet Jury
Theorem’s result.  How much better are fifty than twelve, or nine judges rather than one, and so forth?
The question is harder mathematically than it first appears.  If we ask how quickly (as the number of
voters grows) a majority of a group is very likely to be correct when each individual voter is but barely
likely to be correct, the answer is not quickly at all.  Thus, fifteen voters raise the likelihood of
correctness from .51 (for each voter) to .5309; jumping ahead to judges (for whom the Jury Theorem
may sometimes or arguably be applicable), there may not be much support on this ground for the
common idea that supreme courts, which use simple majority rules, should have 6 (or 2 or 4) more
members than intermediate appellate courts.  It takes many more voters to do much better, and even
if each voter is .6  or .7 likely to be right, a few more voters do not add terribly much with simple
majority rule.   See Nicholas R. Miller, Information, Electorates and Democracy: Some Extensions
and Interpretations of the Condorce t Jury Theorem, in Information Pooling and Group Decision
Making 173, 176 (Bernard Grofman & Guillermo Owen eds., 1986).  It goes almost without saying,
however, that a few more voters, or judges, might be desirable for  political or deliberative or d iversity
reasons, or it might simply put an expert in the group, at least with respect to most subjects likely to
be encountered.  These sorts of reasons for expanding the number of judges, committee members, or
other voters are excluded from the Condorcet Jury Theorem’s domain.
The group approach is more attractive when we abide by a supermajority or unanimous
decision.  When each of three jurors is .51  likely to be correct, and they all agree, there is a .5299
chance that they are all correct rather than all incorrect.  (If each were .6  likely to be  correct, it would
be much more likely, on the order of .77, that if they all agree they are all correct.)  It is a Bayesian
question of the form “if each voter and potential voter is .51 likely to be correct and we observe three
an identifiable expert).24  An obvious implication is that a jury system that
employed a jury of fifty would do much better than one that deployed a
jury of six – and dramatically so if (as is common) there is a supermajority
rule in place and the larger group is able to satisfy that rule.25
voters agreeing (which is itself only slightly more than a .25 chance), how likely is it that these
agreeing voters are all correct rather than all incorrect?”  For three jurors, we have p3/( p3  + (1-p)3),
where p is the chance that each voter is correct rather than not.  See Bernard Grofman & Guillermo
Owen, Condorcet Models, Avenues for Future Research, in Information Pooling and Group Decision
Making 93, 98 (Bernard Grofman & Guillermo Owen eds., 1986).  As the number of voters increases,
and as the likelihood that each is correct increases, the chance that the supermajority is correct
increases – but of course the likelihood that they are unanimous or nearly so decreases.  Twelve like-
minded jurors, each .51 likely to be right, are .6178 likely to be correct, but the probability that they
will all agree in the first place is very small, less than .01.  If we ask for a   supermajority of 9/12, the
likelihood of gaining a supermajority is .1469, and the likelihood that this supermajority is right is
.5658.  And if each juror is .6 likely to be correct, they are .24 likely to form an agreeable
supermajority, and will then have a .9365 chance of being correct.  If we seek a supermajority of five
out of a group of six jurors, each .6 likely to be correct, we have a .2742 chance of agreement and then
a .8506 chance of correctness.  (We must add the chance of a correct 5/6  agreement with that of a
correct unanimous, 6/6, agreement:      (p6 + 6p5(1-p))/(p6 + (1-p)6 + 6p5(1-p) + 6(1-p)5p), where p  is,
once again, the chance that each voter is correct.)
But of course these numbers should appeal only to the purist, as they are misleading.  In
reality, when supermajority or unanimity rules are in place, and especially when they are symmetrical
as between the parties, the voters are encouraged to deliberate and  to reach a verdict.  It is hard ly the
case that 99 out of 100 twelve-person juries generate  mistrials when bound by a unanimity rule.
Without some excellent theory and evidence as to how such compromise verdicts (if they are that) are
reached, it will be  impossible to assess our confidence in the correctness of the results. 
Finally, note that the discussion sets aside such things as the possibility that six jurors would
pay more attention to the evidence than would the fifty because of a kind of collective action problem.
But this sort of claim takes aim at the basic assumptions of the Jury Theorem, because it raises the
possibility that each member of a small group is significantly more likely to be right than each member
of a large group.
But now what if a very large jury assessed the likelihood that the
requirements for liability have been met  as .7 and .6, respectively?  Is it not
possible that if a single factfinder or a small jury did so we ought to be
comfortable applying the product rule on our way to finding that .42 was
less than what the POE rule required, but that when a large group does so
we should somehow think it more likely that they are right on both counts?
The easiest version of this argument focuses on a psychological and
behavioral question.  It is quite plausible that members of a large jury have
little inkling of the Condorcet Jury Theorem so that they do not appreciate
the added value of their own agreement.  If every juror reacts to evidence
of defendant’s negligence with an individual assessment that this is .6
26  I hesitate to say that the probability approaches 1.0 because of the problem, see id., that
in reality this unanimous group may have compromised or impatiently emerged with a unanimous
decision.  In any event, the text avoids some nuances that are not central to the argument.  Thus, I
ignore the possibility that voters know when to abstain; it is possible that an advantage of large-group
decisionmaking is that those who know that they are clueless abstain, while the remaining voters do
better because they are more expert.  I also avoid questions that are not posed in binary form.  We can
ask as many jurors as we like to add .25 and .6, and the fact that most if not all give answers of .85
does not make the right answer 1.0.  The Jury Theorem is best framed as dealing with binary
questions, such as guilt (under some standard) or not, liability or not, and so forth.  If we ask jurors
whether the sum of .25 and .6 is more likely to be .85 or 1.0, and each is more likely than not to get
such an addition problem right, then with a likelihood approaching 1.0 the  group will vote for .85. 
Still, framing can turn many questions into binary form.  If we want an assessment of negligence, we
can ask a jury whether a defendant is more  than .5 likely to have behaved negligently.  If there is an
affirmative answer we can then ask whether it is more than .6  likely, and so forth.  But for the most
part we avoid confusion if we are careful with the part of the Jury Theorem that requires that each
voter be more likely than not to get the question right.
Still, framing can make the Theorem’s applicability a slippery question.  Imagine that the
evidence suggests that A was negligent in injuring B, but that one witness thought that B has a
preexisting condition such that it was possible, perhaps 10% or 20% likely that A did not cause B’s
injury.  If this witness was perfectly credible, all the jurors might simply share the view that A was
negligent and that A probably caused B’s harm.  Additional jurors or voters will simply confirm the
reaction to the defense witness but it will not raise the probability of getting it all right to 1.0.  For the
purpose of the present paper, however, I think it more than sufficient to say that large juries or large
supermajorities can often raise our confidence level above what any one juror thinks.  I will be careful
not to insist that this increase is to the limit -- but I do think it is fair to say that without the benefit of
the Condorcet Jury Theorem we would underestimate the power of group decisionmaking.
likely, it seems plausible if not certain that this jury would report a
unanimous .6 assessment (if asked for a number).  But we would know (by
way of the Jury Theorem) that these well meaning jurors failed to
appreciate the combined power of their assessments.  Had we asked each
whether the assessment of negligence should be .6 or more, all would have
responded affirmatively, and it is reasonable to think that every juror is
more likely than not to get this question right.  If each juror thinks that .6 is
a good assessment of the first requirement, and .7 is a good assessment of
the second, then the large jury’s overall chance of being right may be quite
high with respect to each question.  The product rule is still correct, to be
sure, but the product rule yields a number almost surely closer to 1.0 than
to .42.26
27  It is possible that thinking of this sort is at the root of the argument in Neil Cohen,
Confidence in Probability: Burdens of Persuasion in a World of Imperfect Knowledge, 60 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 385 , 399 (1985), that subjective assessments of probabilities by factfinders are more properly
analogized to probabilities from sample data rather than complete information. One claim is that "[n]ot
only must factfinders determine that their best estimate of the probability in question exceeds the
threshold level – 0.5 for the preponderance of the evidence standard – based on the evidence
presented, but they also must have a certain level of confidence that the true probability, based on all
possible evidence, exceeds that threshold."   But Cohen says nothing about the number of factfinders,
and indeed the argument might be a bout a single assessor.
This link between the Condorcet Jury Theorem and the product rule
might serve to explain law’s disinclination to instruct factfinders according
to that basic rule of probability.  If juries systematically underassess their
ability to find facts, then they might well multiply their average or
individual assessments rather than the improved findings of the group.  In
some sense this argument is like the familiar reaction dismissed above in
Section I.B.1., that the product rule is suppressed because of misuse and
abuse by factfinders (or attorneys).  Here the misuse claim is that juries
would take the product of two (or more) numbers that are lower than the
numbers that they ought to use.  They should, in a sense, be good
Bayesians, asking, for instance, what the chances are that one factfinder
who finds a .6 likelihood of negligence would be wrong about the presence
of negligence given that eleven other jurors have found the same thing.
But inasmuch as this is difficult to understand and carry out, it is quite
plausible that law does better leaving out the product rule rather than
including it in its instructions to finders of fact.27  This is not to say that
lawmakers do this consciously; the evolutionary process of law may be
mysterious, but this sort of  explanation or rationalization follows a long
tradition of positive theorizing.
This explanation of the math-law divide is, of course, more powerful
the larger the jury.  It will not, for example, allow us to say much about
panels of three judges who decide cases on appeal – even when we are
satisfied that these judges are searching for a correct answer, and not
28  Though it should be noted that statutes or constitutions permitting plebiscites, referenda,
or other exercises in direct democracy sometimes limit the problem by imposing a single-subject
requirement on these popular votes.  See generally James D. Gordon III & David B. Magleby, Pre-
Election Judicial Review Of Initiatives And Referendums, 64 Notre Dame L. Rev. 298, 303 (1989).
29  Matthew Rabin & Joel l. Schrag, First Impressions Matter: A Model of Confirmatory Bias,
114 Q.J. Econ 37 (1999).
injecting preferences, predictable expertise, and so forth.  These panels,
discussed in Section III.C. below, raise questions that are comparable to
those raised by factfinding because appeals often deal with multiple issues,
all of which must be decided one way to support a legal remedy.  Thus, a
panel of judges might be deciding whether a claimant has standing even as
it hears arguments about whether substantive law supports the claim.  The
familiar conjunctive question arises, albeit in slightly different form, when
we ask what such a panel – or any single judge on it – should do if it thinks
that there is a .6 chance that the (best or constitutional or inherited) law of
standing provides for standing and a .7 chance that the claimant should (if
standing is found) succeed as a matter of substantive law.   For now, it is
easy to anticipate a conclusion offered in Part III below with the point that
the Condorcet Jury Theorem argument developed here may be extremely
attractive for referenda involving thousands of voters28 and for truly
unanimous juries (of even small size), somewhat useful for juries of twelve
– but quite useful when these juries reach true supermajority decisions, and
of little use for panels of three judges or for other small juries that can
decide matters with simple majority votes.
 Finally, it may be worthwhile to note that the argument offered
here may be offset by the well known tendency of people to be sticky and
even over-confident (if expert) in their initial judgments.29  If an individual
juror is initially offered evidence that suggests likelihoods of .6 and .7, it is
possible that the individual will overestimate his confidence in the two
results and also discount contradictory evidence; deliberation might
30  More generally, it would be useful to know more about the relative strength of the
confirmatory and self-confidence biases.  It would be interesting to see how juries reacted to hearing
first from one side or the other (because the confirmatory bias suggests that there is an advantage in
going first) and to hearing warnings about the bias itself.  But these topics are beyond the scope of this
Article.  I aim to make discrete points about the Jury Theorem, the likely views of inframarginal jurors
(especially where there are supermajority reequirements), and the product rule.  I refer to these
perception biases in order to remind readers and author alike that there is much more going on than
what is discussed in this Article.
polarize or deepen individual convictions, and individuals might discount
evidence or arguments that contradict their first impressions, while
accepting that which confirms first impressions.  The over-confident juror
may then report likelihoods greater than .6 and .7, or may misapply the
product rule in a way that yields something greater than .5 – and certainly
greater than .42.  Taken alone, this danger (or bias if it is really that) might
intensify the math-law divide because overconfidence might be reversed
by instructions to multiply one’s (overconfident) assessments.  But taken
together with the argument offered here about the Condorcet Jury
Theorem, it is possible to say that a group of jurors might individually
assess likelihoods as satisfying the preponderance rule, that they might be
overconfident in their assessments, but that they might not recognize the
power of additional judgments submitted by fellow jurors.  Whether one of
these effects dominates is difficult to know without careful – and even then
only suggestive – empirical testing.  It should be easy to get an idea of test
subjects’ abilities to internalize the Condorcet Jury Theorem, but so far as I
know there is no work on this question of self-centered biases.30
In any event, I can do no more than be suggestive with these
occasional remarks about connections between the arguments offered here
and the psychology literature on various biases.  The Condorcet Jury
Theorem works with individual assessments; we know something about
what happens when individuals deliberate in groups before rendering their
decisions, but there is much that we do not know.  My focus is on
aggregation issues and how they relate to the product rule.  I can only hope
31  Strategic behavior problems are discussed below.  See infra Section II.C.5.a.
32  Put differently, simultaneous as opposed to sequential decisionmaking can lead  to
interesting anomalies.  See infra Section III.B.
33  Roughly speaking, more than a third of the states ask for unanimity in civil cases, see, e.g.,
Conn. Super. Ct. R. 16-30; S.C. R. Civ. P. 48. (South Carolina).  Among the remaining states, about
half call for an 80% supermajority (by requiring agreement of either 10 of 12 or 5 of 6 jurors,
depending on the size of the empaneled jury), many ask for a three-quarters supermajority, and a few
permit two-thirds supermajorities.  See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4113  (Consol. 1999) (10 of 12); Wis. Stat.
§ 805 .09 (1999) (5 of 6); Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 618  (Deering 2000) (three-fourths rule); Tex. Const.
that my suggestions will complement insights regarding the psychology of
group decisionmaking.
C.   Aggregation and Juries
1.   Aggregation of Non-Identical Views (and the
Product Rule)
If we ask a jury for a numerical response, it is obvious that this
group of respondents may have difficulty agreeing on a single answer.31
One possibility is to poll the jurors and aggregate their responses through
some method decided by law.  Another is to instruct the jurors as to how
they should aggregate.  And the third likely method is to allow the jury to
aggregate as it chooses.  Jumping ahead of the argument – partly in the
interest of appealing to readers from jurisdictions that do not use juries for
this sort of thing – it should be noted that panels of judges can be
substituted for jurors in most of this discussion, and the idea of allowing
the group to aggregate on its own may amount to a version of “outcome”
as opposed to “issue” voting, a choice discussed below.32
Perhaps the simplest form of my argument in this Section can be
made by beginning with the case where jurors are asked for a final answer,
so that in effect they are instructed to aggregate on their own and without
much guidance.  Consider, in other words, the approximate instruction
given to most American juries in tort cases: “Tell the court by a unanimous
(or supermajority33) verdict whether it is more likely than not that
Art. V, § 13 (three-fourths rule); Mont. Code Ann. § 25-7-403 (2000) (two-thirds rule); Mo. Const.
Art. 1, § 22(a) (two-thirds rule in courts not of record).  There is some variety as to jury size, so that
a greater percentage might be required for a smaller jury.  See Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-248(g) (1999); La.
Code Civ. Pro. Ann. art. 1797 (W est 2000).  Finally, the unanimity requirement is sometimes relaxed,
at least  after some hours of deliberation, see, e.g., Minn. Stat. § 546.17 (1999); Iowa R. Civ. P. 203,
and in many states the parties can opt out of the unanimity rule by agreeing on another decision rule.
 The supermajority character of the argument offered here is emphasized in the next Section of the
text.
34  For expository purposes, I set aside the question of whether the presiding judge permits
the jury to convey this information.
35  The language in the text reflects the fact that apart from rare (and perhaps nonexistent)
cases with special verdicts as to the jury’s precise judgment, we have not received a .51 response but
rather an affirmative answer to the question of whether each requirement is me by the POE standard,
which is to say is more than .5 likely.  More generally, it should be noted that special verdicts of the
kind observed do not much affect the analysis here.  Juries simply tell us that multiple requirements
are met (one at a time).  They are not encouraged to take the products of probabilities.  Nor, of course,
does the discussion here suggest that they ought to be so encouraged. 
defendant was negligent and tell us also whether this negligence caused
plaintiff’s injury.  If you answer both questions affirmatively, we will ask
for your help with respect to damages.”
Imagine that there are twelve jurors and that nine (or more) agree
that yes, it is more likely than not that there was negligence and the
requisite causation.  I refer to this as an agreement that the probability of
defendant’s negligence exceeds .5, and that the likelihood of the relevant
causation also exceeds that important number.  In fact, let us imagine the
worst-case scenario from the point of view of the math-law puzzle.  The
supermajority informs the court that in fact it has just barely reached the
decision it reported.34  Nine jurors are willing to vote that there is at least a
.51 chance of negligence and nine are willing to vote that there is at least a
.51 chance of causation, and all the jurors believe that the two likelihoods
are independent.  The product rule encourages us to argue that a finding of
liability would be lawless here because the conjunctive probability may be
on the order of only .26.35
36  Little of the argument here is affected by the question of whether the majority on one
question is different from that supporting the other.  Strategic problems aside (for now), it  should
matter little.
But it is easy to imagine that each supermajority group of nine36
incorporated individual assessments ranging from just over .5 all the way
to 1.0.  Just as a majority vote for candidate X in a general election is likely
to mean that some voters barely prefer X over the alternatives while some
very much prefer X, a vote for (as opposed to against) the .51 response is
likely to mean that some voters are at .6 or .75 or even 1.0 (or indeed at .51
for that matter).  In the absence of additional information about the actual
distribution, we might even proceed amateurishly and recklessly, and
hazard a guess that the average assessment of this group of nine is .75,
halfway between the marginal .51 vote and the ceiling offered by 1.0.  If we
apply the product rule, then .75 times .75 is about .56, exceeding the .5
marker of the POE rule.
I intend to deal with several problems, or unsubtle steps, in this
quick example, but it is worth emphasizing the straightforward point by
dropping the artificial device of the jury having reported its precise .51
breakpoint.  If the jury merely responds to the most familiar question that
is asked of it, agreeing that the necessary majority has voted that each
requirement for liability is more likely than not to be present then, as we
have just seen, our sloppy estimate of what a majority of this jury thinks
might be .75, but there is surely not much of a case for something as low as
.51.  Indeed, our best estimate is undoubtedly higher than before, now that
the jury has not saddled us with precise information about the marginal
voter.  We know now that the marginal member of the majority must be at
.51 or greater.  And, again, if nine of the twelve report two independent
and successive more-likely-than-not findings, it is more than plausible that
a fair application of the product rule would produce a conjunctive
probability of greater than, if not significantly greater than, .5.
37  Perhaps I should say “more intense assessments” because the jury’s report will in like
fashion suppress information that would have suggested a lower numerical assessment when the jury
finds that a requirement is less likely than not to be present.  But the math-law divide is an issue only
where  multiple requirements are all (individually) assessed as satisfying the standard for liability. 
Note that the explanation offered here does not depend on the Jury Theorem and therefore,
unlike the argument advanced in Section II.B ., it is not open to claims that the assumptions of that
theorem are absent.  
38  The only saving grace of the  law’s suppression of the product rule (as I will continue to
call it) comes from the Jury Theorem.  If nine million jurors thought .51 and three million thought 0.0,
then following the Condorcet Jury Theorem we might be quite confident in the .51.  Certainly if the
supermajority multitude thought .7 and the minority thought 0.0, we would be comfortable with
liability (even though (.7)(.7) is less than .5).  But I am trying to set aside this argument from the Jury
In short, there is a neat explanation for the math-law divide where
multiple decisionmakers are concerned because the aggregation process
passes over information that would have suggested higher numerical
assessments.37  The mathematician is not generally asked about an
aggregation issue, so that in fact there is no inconsistency between the
mathematician’s and lawyer’s intuitions.  When a group decides that two
things are more likely than not, the members of the group are on average
likely to be much more confident than an individual responding with two
more-likely-than-not assessments.  If we were to apply the product rule,
we would need a great deal of information from this group (as emphasized
presently).  And if our choice is either to apply the product rule to those
numbers that a majority of the voters’ assessments exceed or to avoid the
product rule entirely, we are very likely to do better by avoiding the
product rule.
It is of course possible to imagine cases in which suppressing the
product rule will be indefensible on the above reasoning.  Imagine, for
example, that three jurors regard negligence as 0.0 likely and nine regard
negligence as .51 likely, and that the same is true for causation.  Setting
aside the possibility of compromise, the jury will report that the POE
standard is satisfied for both requirements, and we will wish that we used
the product rule to discourage a finding of liability.38  But this sort of
Theorem against the simple application of the product rule in part because we can do better and in part
because we do not deploy juries of huge populations.
39  See ___ [EL cases and discusion] 
distribution is probably unlikely, and the cases against the product rule
surely outnumber those that beg for it.  Lawyers are accustomed to
overinclusive rules and explanations.
2.  Alternative Requirements Revisited
We must also reckon with cases where there are not multiple
requirements but rather a single requirement or alternative requirements.
Single requirement cases are discussed in Section II.4 below.  In the case of
alternative requirements for liability, the product rule would favor
plaintiff.  The jury may report that each alternative is less likely than not to
be met, but we are interested in more precise assessments in order to know
whether it is in fact more likely than not that not a single one of the
alternative conditions has been met.  If the plaintiff wins by showing one or
more of W, D, and M, for example, and the jury responds that the
likelihood of each is .5 or less, we might imagine (sloppily) that they really
“agree” on .45 and that our best guess is .4 for each if only because the Jury
Theorem gives us some added confidence.  In this illustration the
likelihood that all three causes of action fall in defendant’s favor is
(.6)(.6)(.6) = .216, and perhaps plaintiff should win.  We might worry that
the suppression of the product rule has unfairly denied plaintiff’s recovery
because the chances are that defendant is liable because of either W or D or
M, even though the jury does not think that any one alone is more likely
than not.39
Once again, however, we have not yet taken into account the spread
of the jury’s assessments and the question of how to aggregate diverse
reactions to the evidence.  If the jurors assessments are spread or
concentrated far below the .5 divide (about which they were polled), and
these likelihoods are independent, then it is possible that plaintiff should
still lose and that once again the supermajority rule can be seen as a
substitute for the product rule.  Thus, if our best guesses are not .45 but
rather, say, .3 for W, .2 for D, and .1 for M, then the likelihood that D
succeeds in defending against all  three grounds argued by plaintiff at once
is (.7)(.8)(.9) = .504.  Plainly, when a large supermajority says that each of
two or more alternative requirements is less likely than not to be met, our
best guesses might be well below the .5 cutoff so that again the product
rule’s suppression may do no harm.
3.  Supermajorities
Supermajority requirements obviously play an important role in
these arguments about aggregation and conjunction. With a 7-5 vote we
might reason that the negative voters’ assessments offset the inframarginal
affirmative voters, and that our swing voter is likely to be close to the
cutoff that the jury instructions inquired into.  But with a 9-3 or 12-0
supermajority, we might have confidence that the median juror (or any
other information used to derive our best estimate of the facts) is well
above the announced cutoff.  Put this way, supermajority voting can be
seen as an alternative to, or as inconsistent with, the product rule.  If a
supermajority finds that negligence is more likely than not, and that
causation is as well, we might regard our best estimates of each as closer to
.75 than .5; with two requirements, the suppression of the product rule may
not vitiate the finding of liability by a supermajority.
I have already implied that our best estimate of a likelihood will
take dissenters’ views into account; it is this intuition that makes a
supermajority look quite different from a simple majority decision that
something is (or is not) more likely than not.  Imagine, for example, that we
could poll the jury and find that we have four jurors responding to
questions about negligence and causation with likelihoods of .3, four at .6,
and four assess at .9.  A majority, and for that matter a two-thirds
supermajority, will respond affirmatively to the preponderance-of-the-
40  In some situations we might choose to discard outliers, but again we would do so at both
ends of the spectrum.  Apart from problems associated with asking jurors for specific assessments
(rather than yes or no responses to the POE question), see infra II.C.5.a., an added  prob lem here is
that jurors may be strategic in their attempts not to be dismissed as outliers. 
The discussion in this Section sets aside the Jury Theorem’s insight that multiple judgments,
in sync with one another, are better than one.  Put slightly differently, the Jury Theorem might itself
be the reason why we abide by majorities, but if the question is neither binary nor one that commands
an absolute majority for a single position, but rather of the kind considered here (where we really want
a point estimate), then there is no reason to throw out the information provided by the putative
minority.
evidence questions.  If we look only at this majority, then we are
comfortable suppressing the product rule because it is hard to justify
anything far from a .75 estimate, and two such independent probabilistic
assessments survive the product rule.  But of course we have four jurors
weighing in at .3, and the very intuitions advanced thus far suggest that
our best estimates should count those views as well, in which case we find
ourselves at .6 for each requirement, and with a product below that
required by the POE rule.40 
In this example, a rule requiring a three-quarters supermajority will
prove convenient.  In the absence of compromise, the jury will fall one
short of the necessary supermajority and there will be no liability.
Generally speaking, when a supermajority of a reasonably sized jury
responds affirmatively to the POE questions it is asked to consider, we can
guess that the median and mean of the entire jury are well above .5 for
each question.  This gives us reason to be fairly comfortable with a system
that suppresses the product rule and asks only whether a supermajority
believes the POE standard has been met for each question.  Two affirmative
answers from such a supermajority will normally mean that had we
enjoyed the luxury of actual assessments, and had we applied the product
rule, the POE standard would also have been satisfied.  Moreover, if the
alternative is to ask a different, single, yes or no question, namely whether
a majority or supermajority agrees to (at least) a specific probabilistic
assessment, we will do worse.  I return to this idea presently.
41  There seems to  be little relationship  between the size and decision rule of a state's juries
and the degree to which the product rule is suppressed.  Thus, New Hampshire requires a unanimous
verdict from a twelve person jury, but its sample jury instructions are rather ambiguous regarding the
product rule: "T he plaintiff claims: [State essential elements of the claim, making reference to time,
place and circumstances] …These are the issues which are to be determined by you based on the facts
as you find them to be and by applying the law as the court instructs you."  New Hampshire Civil Jury
Instructions § 1.1  (1999).  Michigan permits a verdict from five out of six jurors, but the product rule
is suppressed  in the sample jury instructions.  Michigan's Standard Jury Instructions (Civil) read, "The
plaintiff has the burden of proof on each of the following propositions: a. that the plaintiff was injured;
b. that the defendant was negligent in one or more of the ways claimed by the plaintiff, as stated to you
in these instructions; c. that the negligence of the defendant was a proximate cause of the injuries to
the plaintiff." SJI2d 16.02.
I do not mean to overstate the fit between the rather common
unanimity (or high supermajority) requirement, where juries are used, and
the absence of a product rule.  The connection is a coarse one.  Without
careful empirical work regarding instructions, jury reversals, and the like,
it would be reckless (and surely incorrect) to claim rather wishfully that
there is more suppression of the product rule with larger juries.  As far as I
can tell, the product rule is suppressed with supermajority juries of six and
eight just as it is with unanimous groups of twelve.41  Still, it is not entirely
reckless to suggest that it would not be easy to incorporate the product rule
into jury decisionmaking, that severe supermajority jury rules are
surprisingly common, that supermajority responses to POE questions are
likely to reflect assessments that are further from .5 than first meets the eye
and, finally, that with such numbers we might worry less about the
suppression of the product rule.
4.  Single Requirement Cases
If aggregation and conjunction are indeed somehow or even
sensibly connected through the idea  of thinking about inframarginal jurors
and what they say about our best assessments of likelihoods, then we need
to revisit familiar cases were there is no issue of conjunction.  If a jury is
asked but one question, and most or all voters agree that the answer
satisfies some standard such as POE or even reasonable doubt, then it is
42  See Saul Levmore, Probabilistic Recoveries, Restitution, and Recurring Wrongs, 19 J.
Legal Stud. 691 (1990).
likely as we have seen that our best assessment is much more confident, if
that is the word, than is first apparent.
And yet it is not as if the supermajority rule is relaxed when a jury is
asked but one question.  If we observed a legal system that asked for
unanimous jury verdicts only where multiple (independent) questions
were posed or only in areas of law, such as torts, where multiple questions
are common, it would be much more obvious that there was a connection
between conjunction and aggregation.  
Imagine, for example, that a judge asks a jury whether defendant
has more likely than not given an inadequate warning.  Imagine further
that there is no other jury question; perhaps all else is stipulated, or
perhaps there is a fine or liability rule associated with an inadequate
warning.  If all jurors respond affirmatively, we know (compromise and
Condorcet aside) that the marginal juror is somewhere above .5 but that
the average juror is likely to be at some point significantly higher than .5. 
But if so, perhaps our rule is too restrictive.  After all, if we have some faith
in the Jury Theorem and we like the POE rule in civil cases, as I think we
should42, and seven of twelve jurors are above .5, and the mean response is
above .5, then why not prefer liability where that result is supported by a
majority but not a required supermajority?
The preceding question can be reformulated in a number of ways.
One is to ask why we like supermajority decisions in the first place.
Another, more formidable construction, asks how we justify  supermajority
or even unanimous decisions for juries while abiding by simple majorities
in the very same cases when issues are reviewed by panels of appellate
43  See Saul Levmore, More than Simple Majorities, __Utah L. Rev. (forthcoming Lecture).
judges.  The larger question, about why and where we require
supermajorities, is a topic saved for another day.43
For present purposes, one fairly safe argument should suffice.  It is
that we might require supermajorities in order to encourage some care on
the parts of jurors.  If juries knew that simple majority decisions were
acceptable, they might retire to the jury room and impatiently poll the
group and (absent a tie vote) decide that their job was done.  If there is
some value to considering evidence that one missed the first time, to
hearing others’ observations, and to concentrating on the matter at hand,
then a supermajority requirement may be an elegant means of forcing such
steps.  One can barely imagine a legal system that encouraged a judge to
tell the jury that it needs a supermajority verdict where there are multiple
(or, as we will see, alternative) requirements, but that it might reach a
simple majority verdict after due deliberation where there is but one
requirement or factual question.
But there are reasons not to suggest that we eliminate the
supermajority requirement for single requirement cases.  Most important is
the possibility that the category of concern, consisting of single
requirement (jury) cases, is exceedingly small.  Most tort cases will have
the jury deciding negligence and causation and more.  Most contract cases
will also require the jury to consider a number of requirements because of
the various available defenses.  The plaintiff might win a case if the
defendant failed to deliver goods as promised and such delivery would not
have been impossible (or otherwise excused) and the plaintiff mitigated in a
reasonable manner, and so forth.  In area after area of law, when we rely
on juries, we give them multiple questions and we await a series of
(somewhat) independent assessments before imposing liability or finding
guilt.  As such, the number of cases where we might be tempted to tell our
44  Unfortunately, it is difficult to quantify this conjecture.  In a large fraction of jury-verdict
cases reasonable people might disagree as to whether the jury had been asked one or multiple
independent questions.  There is difficulty in assessing whether a jury deliberated and voted on
multiple  requirements (or a single one) and there is also difficulty in assessing whether these multiple
questions would (or should) have been regarded as independent.  A random sample of jury verd icts
reported in California Jury Verdicts Weekly (Jan. - Mar. 1996), for example, suggests that in about
30% of cases, jurors must decide on two or more independent, contested elements.  In another 20%
of the cases, it is clear that jurors are only asked to decide one issue, either because one or more issues
are stipulated or not seriously contested or because the case involved but one issue.  But in the
remaining 50% of the sample cases, it is not clear whether the jury is deciding one issue or more.
These cases ostensibly involve multiple elements, but often they are  interdependent, as when multiple
issues depend on the credibility of a single witness.
45  The blending of views into a single number is a useful reminder of the sort of process
explored here.  If a supermajority agrees on liability but then d iscovered, for example, that their
damage assessments differ and range from one hundred  thousand dollars to one million dollars, I think
we would be startled to hear that they could not come to agree on a “unanimous” verdict if required
to do so.  And it would seem unlikely that our best guess as to their compromise or unanimous verdict
would be one hundred thousand dollars.  We expect verdicts to reflect the mean or median voter, more
or less -- and for strategic behavior reasons we would are unlikely to wish it were otherwise -- and that
is why supermajority verdicts (especially) might not require much in the way of application of the
judges to instruct juries to abide by a simple majority rule simply because
the jury is asked but a single question may well be quite small.44  It is easy
to imagine that judges who were empowered to instruct juries to switch to
simple majority decision rules would so overuse this tool as to make things
worse rather than better.
Another way to rationalize the use of supermajorities even where
single requirements are issue, is to make some reasonable assumptions
about the process of jury compromise.  If ten jurors think that plaintiff has
satisfied the single POE requirement, but two jurors insist on assessments
of .4, for example, then it is possible that the two will give in to the ten but
expect to influence the group to award lower damages than might
otherwise seem to have been caused by the defendant.  Put differently,
supermajority  requirements may be relaxed by potential dissenters who
are influenced by the cultural and democratic norm in favor of simple
majority rule, or even who intuit the Jury Theorem.  Of course, the more
this is so, the less confident we can be that a supermajority reaction to a
POE question reflects an assessment that is much above or below .5.45
product rule.
46  See supra Section I.B.5 & II.C.5.a.
In any event, the most ambitious form of the positive argument
advanced here is that the supermajority voting rule in juries takes the place
of the product rule where multiple requirements are concerned.  We might
begin with the danger of simple majority rules and juries rushing to
judgment, in which case we prefer supermajorities and then suppress the
product rule “because” we would otherwise dramatically overassess
likelihoods.  Alternatively, we might begin the description with the
suppression of the product rule on grounds of math anxiety or strategic
behavior,46 and then conceive of the supermajority requirement as a
substitute for the product rule.  Either way, the argument is most powerful
if most cases do involve questions for conjunction.
5.   Jury Assessments and Strategic Behavior
a.   Asking the Right Questions
I have repeatedly deferred or even avoided the question of why we
do not simply ask all the jurors for their best, precise assessments.  Note
that we have no reason to ask unless there are multiple (and somewhat
independent) requirements for liability so that we might wish to use the
product rule.  In any event, if jurors could and would answer this sort of
question sincerely, which is to say without an eye on the aggregate result,
we might do much better than we can hope to do by asking multiple POE,
yes or no, questions while suppressing the product rule.  And it goes
almost without saying that, at least following the argument developed
here, we should overcome the math-law divide and apply the product rule
when appropriate to these precise responses.  
One reason we do not ask for precise probabilistic assessments, but
prefer instead the “does it satisfy the POE standard (or not)” question,
followed by the same question with regard to the next requirement for
liability, is no doubt that we appreciate the level of math anxiety present in
the population of jurors (not to mention judges).  For obvious reasons, I do
47  Note that I am not claiming that this strategic behavior leads to perverse results, by which
I mean results that are contrary to what the majority itself prefers.  For some development of this
theory, see Saul Levmore, Voting with Intensity, _ Stanford L. Rev. _ (2000), where there is a claim
that most legal and political systems prefer schemes that do not lend themselves to strategic behavior
that can lead to perverse results – which is to say ex post “dissatisfied majorities.”  For example, if we
allowed people to buy and sell votes, we might easily find ourselves with a winning candidate that a
majority did not wish for (even in a two candidate election) and that even most intense voters did not
prefer.  This winner may have emerged because voters misestimated the likely vote or the likely price
of votes.  In contrast, if half a jury assesses negligence (and causation, to make the example quicker)
at .6 and half at .9, we know that the wisdom of the group favors liability, even with the product rule
applied.  But some of the .6 assessors may see that when they apply the product rule to their own
assessments, the defendant is free of liability.  Fearful that other voters will come up with higher
numbers, they might respond  with 0 or .1 when polled.  But at least they will be pleased if there is no
liability.  
48  I do not discuss deliberation here, but it is hard to see why we should prefer to take these
votes without or prior to deliberation.  Among other things, deliberation can serve to bring out
“expert” knowledge and assessments which (even) the Jury Theorem bows to.
not dwell on this easy explanation, though I must admit it as a serious
explanation.  Cutting against it is the fact that we do ask identical panels to
decide damages where they have found liability, and these damage
calculations require much more than yes or no (or greater or lesser)
responses.  They call for estimates, extrapolations, present values, and so
forth. 
The second and more trying reason is, I think, that we correctly
hesitate to enable strategic behavior by jurors (or judges) because if such
behavior is unevenly distributed, group decisionmaking quickly loses its
appeal.47  The problem is especially acute if jurors think that we are
interested in the mean response.  If six jurors bear true assessments of .6,
and six are at .9, then following deliberation48 the mean response is of
course .75 and, if the same is true with regard to the next question, liability
is found even after the product rule is applied.  But if even one member
whose own assessments are, say, .6 and .6 sees that the product rule as
applied to his assessments alone suggests that the defendant be free of
liability, and acts upon this by responding strategically with 0.0 to each
question, then the mean responses (of .7) will be insufficient to survive the
product rule.  There is much more that could be said about successful and
49  In an important sense, this argument is a close relative of one considered in the matter of
“issue” versus “outcome” voting on judicial panels.  See Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager,
The One and the Many: Adjudication in Collegial Courts, 81 Calif. L. Rev. 1, 55-56 (1993).
50  Unless the problems is that a juror may think that the deterrence or expressive function
of law is too far in one direction or the other.  In  that case, a juror will be extreme and little influenced
by the facts of the particular  case. 
51  The plan gives up on the Condorcet Jury Theorem, in a manner of speaking.
52  If I were not trying to set the Jury Theorem aside, I might say that with numerous jurors
(perhaps twelve), we ought to be satisfied with asking whether their assessments exceeded .6 or even
some lower assessment.
unsuccessful strategic behavior here, but I suspect that most readers will be
satisfied with this account (and impatient with more).49  Legal systems
prefer to ask voters, and certainly voters on juries, simple, manageable
questions that do not immediately generate strategic responses.  Strategic
responses can ruin the majoritarian exercise.  Even limited awareness of the
presence of strategic behavior can demoralize the citizenry.
Nor will it do much good to ask the jury to aggregate on its own and
to provide a numerical group assessment.  The problem is not in the court’s
ability to aggregate without enabling strategic voting, but rather in the
incentive to dissemble under (at least) some aggregation strategies.  If the
jury reports its mean assessment, the analysis is much the same as above.
The trick, then, is to aggregate in a way that is resistant to strategic
voting.  One possibility is not to aggregate.  Thus, each member might
enter a slip of paper, and the group’s assessment will be the assessment on
the one slip that is pulled from the pile in lottery style.  The advantage of
such a scheme is that one may as well be honest.50  But one disadvantage is
that we throw away all that might be gained from numerous voters.51
A better plan might be to focus on the jury’s median response.  In
the case of a supermajority requirment this translates into the marginal (as
it were) response.  If we ask a supermajority whether its level of confidence
exceeds .7,52 the idea being that two such affirmative responses might lead
us to think that even with the product rule we are on safe ground, then
there is little if any room for destructive strategic behavior.  A power-
hungry juror may be  confident in her own assessment of .4, but she gains
nothing by feigning with a response that her assessment exceeds the .7
mark.  Similarly, a juror who senses from deliberation that her assessment
is above the median or relevant margin is not offered the chance to
exaggerate, and will hardly gain by giving a dishonest response.  We have
simply asked whether individual assessments are above or below a
number.  One can influence a mean but not a median with exaggeration.
Eliciting binary responses in this manner eliminates useful information
when the voters are not evenly distributed, but at least we gain something
from the deployment of  many voters and we do not leave the process as
open to strategic behavior problems.
b.   Why Jurors Might Not be Strategic
I do not wish to abandon these jury issues with the impression that
strategic behavior problems must necessarily drive any positive or
normative analysis of this relationship between aggregation and
conjunction issues.   It is useful though perhaps startling to question the
intuition that some jurors might simply like to get their way, and that
strategic behavior will be tempting.
To do this, we need to return to the Condorcet Jury Theorem, which
tells us that when there is a right answer to a question, as opposed to a
matter of preferences or a matter that is pure guesswork (at least for
nonexperts), each of us should be pleased to have the assistance of many
other voters.  If the majority of my group, and especially of a large group,
votes for X on such a matter, then if I am in the minority and voted for not-
X, it would normally be foolish for me to want to get my way.  In these
situations, if my goal is to get the question right or do my civic duty, then I
should be pleased to accede to the majority.  In turn, if voters behave as I
hope I would, the legal system can safely use mean juror responses (and
need not resort to medians) because the jurors will have no interest in
voting strategically.
53  One reason it is hard to accept the idea that strategic voting may be against self-interest
in some settings, is that we do not experience these settings in everyday life.  Thus, in law schools and
law firms and congressional committees, voting is often about matters that relate to one’s preferences
– rather than to something that has a “right” answer (and regarding which we are unlikely to be
expert).  But if the Jury Theorem is useful in some domain, and if actual jury decisions as deployed
by courts are included in this domain, then strategic behavior “should” be less of an issue than is
normally thought.  
This is not the place to dwell on this rather abstract and
counterintuitive argument.  It asks us to believe that the legal system
reliably asks jurors to do those tasks for which the Jury Theorem is
applicable.  It asks us to believe very little of what is commonly said about
jurors and judges on panels, because a familiar kind of intellectual
ambition, ego gratification, and power grabbing is assumed away.53  These
are difficult steps and yet it is possible that we cannot know what to make
of the product rule or of its suppression without a better understanding of
when and why jurors and judges vote strategically.
D.   A Note on Supermajoritarianism
The preceding Section put forward the idea that when
supermajorities agree that a given standard (such as the preponderance of
the evidence) has been met, we can normally reason that the standard has
been exceeded by a significant amount.  In turn, if there are two (or
perhaps even more) requirements for liability (or some other conclusion)
we can normally suppose that the product rule does not alter the
conclusion in favor of liability.  Suppression is harmless.  Moreover, it may
be very difficult to go about things more directly, especially if jurors are
inclined toward strategic voting.  I have tried in this way to argue that
where law uses sizeable and supermajority juries it is perhaps explicable
(and even desirable) that law suppresses the fundamental intuition of the
product rule.  This approach seeks to explain (or perhaps understand or
simply rationalize) where it is that we suppress the product rule.
A different approach would be to work in reverse and to be more
interested in the selection of a voting rule than in the suppression of the
product rule.  The same set of observations can be used to explain the
54  On the relationship among these tools, see Saul Levmore, Bicameralism: When are Two
Decisions Better than One?, 12 Int’l. Rev. Law & Econ. 145 (1992).
55  In my own experience in academic settings, simple majority voting has been associated
with a wonderful and remarkably low level of strategic voting.  Participants seemed to act as if they
understood the genius of the Jury Theorem.  Some of the most respected faculty members were often,
as far as I could tell, perfectly content to “lose” and to abide happily by the majority.  My other,
shorter experience has been with serious supermajoritarianism.  It too functions remarkably well.  I
might explain the rule as amounting to fairly explicit deference to experts – in keeping with the Jury
Theorem after all.  Alternatively, every appointments matter can be seen as a difficult question of
agenda-setting because one does not know what future appointment is foreclosed by a current
appointment.  A large and enthusiastic supermajority makes it quite likely that the future candidate will
not be preferred to the present one.
location of supermajority voting rules.  We might eliminate uses of
supermajoritarianism that appear to take the place of bicameralism, other
confederating devices, or “brakes” on faction-supported government
intervention, and then ask whether other instances of supermajority
requirements can be linked to multiple requirements and hence the
(suppression of the) product rule.54  We might be able to explain the
disinclination to assess things more directly (and calculate their product)
with our observations about strategic voting.
This is obviously not the place for such an exhaustive exercise, but it
may be useful to point out that we virtually never find a supermajority
requirement in committees.  Closer to home, law faculties often work with
supermajority requirements for personnel matters, and often not.  These
supermajorities can be explained, I think, but not in ways that have much
to do with the product rule.55
III.   Aggregation with Judges
A.   Single Judges and the Product Rule  
Some of the analysis in Part II leads to the normative conclusion that
a judge working alone in a bench trial should employ the product rule.
And nearly all of the analysis leads to the positive prediction that we
should find single judges using the product rule.  We might expect this
pattern to be subtle, both because of the disinclination to deal explicitly
56  Or at least so they might think.  In fact it might be hard to choose between the
supermajority requirement and the single judge.
57  In American jurisdictions we can look to see whether judges acting alone implicitly apply
the product rule where there are multiple requirements.  In most non-Amercian jurisdictions judges
generally operate without juries – but then sometimes in panels – so that comparisons are likely to be
especially interesting.  But I should warn the reader that I am not holding back any striking evidence
in favor of the broad application of the thesis advanced here.  I know of no jurisdiction that explicitly
applies the product rule.
58  There would also be opportunity to see a subtle effect when panel decisions were
unanimous.  Thus, if a three judge panel is unanimous in finding two elements of liability, we might
anticipate more subtle suppression of the product rule than if the panel had been divided.
59  See supra text accompanying note 28.
with mathematical and statistical concepts and because judges might try to
parry the inclination of parties to prefer (or avoid) jury trials in order to
avoid (or gain) the product rule.56  Of course, the more subtle the pattern,
the more difficult to demonstrate.  For the most part, I leave the subject of
bench trials and the product rule for another day, and especially for a
comparative effort.57  This Article continues to focus on aggregation (and
conjunction).
B.   Multi-Member Panels of Factfinding Judges
A panel of several judges engaged in factfinding is of course a kind
of jury.  These judges would offer fewer assessments than provided by
conventional juries, so that the arguments developed in Part II would be
somewhat dampened.  There would be less of a Jury Theorem effect,
though three (or five) heads can surely be better than one, and less
likelihood that a decision in favor of liability under successive POE
standards indicated that in fact our best estimates were high enough to
suggest that proper conjoining would still produce a sound decision in
favor of liability.58  Of course, judges might make other errors that mere
jurors do not make.  If, for example,  judges as experts working alone
suffer from the well-known overconfidence bias, then even the product
rule may do too little.59  If a judge “should” assess two requirements as .7
and .6 likely, but suffering from an overconfidence bias, prepares to deploy
60  Nor is this symmetrical.  The judge who “should” assess at .4 thinks that the requirement
is less likely than not to be present.  The judge will find against liab ility – and if the judge is
overconfident and revises the estimate (in a subconscious sense) to .1, the outcome will be the same.
61  Indeed, if a comparative inquiry suggested that European or Japanese judges, operating
without juries, suppressed the product rule in a manner d ifferent from their American counterparts,
we might connect this observation to the norm of shorter  and much less expensive trials.  
.9 and .9, multiplying those overconfident assessments will produce
liability where the proper application of the product rule would not.60
There is some chance of finding that smaller panels operating with a
simple majority rule suppress the product rule less than large ones bound
by supermajority requirements.  The experiences of agencies, commissions,
military courts and, of course, jurisdictions that do not use juries but
sometimes use multi-member panels of judges can be combed for this
inquiry.  But again this is not yet a comparative enterprise.
Finally, I should note one normative application of the arguments
developed here.  A single judge presiding over a bench trial can purchase
the advantages of the Jury Theorem, after a manner, by hearing from
scores of witnesses and experts.  A judge who thinks she needs only to find
that two requirements set out by law are more likely than not to be present
might hear from one or two witnesses.  But one who wanted to sign off on
.7 or .8 assessments (in order to preserve the possibility of liability even
after multiplying the probabilities attached to two such assessments) might
need to hear from five or ten witnesses on a matter.61
 C.   Appeals Panels
Large portions of the arguments offered in Part II can be extended to
decisions made by panels of judges considering multiple issues on appeal.
There is a small but effective literature on “issue versus outcome voting,”
but advances in this area are possible, I think, through some exploration of
62  See M axwell L. Stearns, Should Justices Ever Switch Votes?: Miller v. Albright in Social
Choice Perspective, 7 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 87 (1999); Evan H. Caminker, Sincere and Strategic Voting
on Multimember Courts, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 2297 (1999).
63  Id.
the relevance of the Jury Theorem and the place of the product rule (or its
suppression).62 
Imagine, once again, that there are two requirements for a
judgment, or at least for a judgment that favors the original plaintiff.
Plaintiff wins if the trial court below was correct in finding not only that
this plaintiff had standing to sue but also that substantive law favored the
plaintiff’s position.  A majority of the appellate court might have supported
the plaintiff on standing, and a different (but obviously overlapping)
majority thinks the lower court was correct in its application of substantive
law in plaintiff’s favor.  A judge who thought there was standing but who
thought that plaintiff should have lost on the second, substantive question
would on her own have decided against plaintiff because plaintiff needs
both issues in his favor.  Thus, if the judges vote sincerely on issues, one at
a time, two distinct majorities produce a victory for plaintiff.  But if we ask
each judge for a decision as to the outcome of the entire appeal, we will get
a different result.  Note that if we choose issue voting, as we generally do
not in American law, a given judge might strategically “change” her vote
regarding the first issue in order to get the overall result she prefers.63
One thing missing in the extant literature is the relevance of a judge’s
level of confidence in her judgment.  There is little reason to weigh levels of
confidence when a panel is deciding one issue.  Deliberation, deference to
expertise, and the prevalence of framing norms that call for up or down
decisions all figure in this conclusion.  But where two or more issues must
be decided for a party to prevail, the insight reflected in the product rule
suggests some interest in the confidence or precise assessments of the
decisionmakers.  On the other hand, we may decline to ask for precise
64  Although we could presumably ask whether the judge’s confidence exceeded some level
or not.  See supra Section II.C.5.a.
65  The same might be true with strategic voting if judges internalize the product rule.
66  Imagine for example that we need two issues decided for plaintiff on appeal in order to
uphold  a finding of liability against the defendant.  If we denote a  decision on an issue for plaintiff
with a “1" and  a decision against plaintiff with a “0," then a judge working alone whose assessment
assessments by judges for the same reason suggested with respect to lay
juries, in order to avoid strategic voting.64
The literature on judicial panels can safely avoid the Jury Theorem
not only because these panels are fairly small but also because these panels
are competing over arguments and even preferences such that the basic
requirements for the Jury Theorem are often absent.  Put differently, even
where we think the Jury Theorem applicable to what these judges do, the
size of the panel and the norm of simple-majority decisionmaking  makes us
less than comfortable with issue-by-issue decisionmaking.
Given small panels and simple-majority decisionmaking, outcome
voting can substitute for the product rule.  Imagine, for example, an appeals
panel with three members deciding a case with two issues of the sort
described earlier.  Any one judge who is confident in finding for the plaintiff
on both issues is of course pleased with an outcome in plaintiff’s favor.  But
a judge who thinks plaintiff should probably win on the standing issue and
just barely win as a matter of substantive law might well internalize the
product rule with the intuition that it is more likely than not that at least one
of the two issues should be decided against plaintiff, in which case plaintiff
should lose.  Inasmuch as we do not normally send appeals to a single judge
this sort of thinking is hypothetical, except that if we ask three judges for
votes as to outcome (only), we might with sincere voting65 get a different
result than we expected after tallying their views as to the two issues.  The
jury-judge difference is thus fairly straightforward.  An optimistic, positive
view is that the product rule is reasonably suppressed on fairly large juries
with supermajority votes and it is imperfectly supplanted by outcome
voting in the case of small, majoritarian judicial panels.66
is (0,1) or (1,0) should decide  against p laintiff, while one who finds on both issues for plaintiff,
denoted as  (1,1), will find for plaintiff.  Imagine now that Panel A consists of three judges whose
assessments are (0,1), (1,0) , and (1 ,1), and  that Panel B in a different case has assessments of (1,1),
(1,1), and (0,0).  Panel A’s issue voting yields a win for plaintiff, but two of the three judges would
with outcome voting decide against plaintiff.  Panel B decide for  plaintiff by a 2-1 vo te either way.
With numerous panelists, issue voting seems superior.  There are, after all, two affirmative (and by
hypothesis, independent) assessments for each issue on the two panels.  But on a small panel the
argument for outcome voting is that we may mimic what the product rule would have done with
precisely recorded assessments.  Panel B’s outcome demonstrates, of course, that outcome vo ting is
not a perfect substitute for precise assessments plus the product rule.
67  If we set aside the aggregation and product rule issues discussed here, a decent argument
for outcome voting is that it removes the temptation to vote strategically.  The more we ask for
outcomes, the less room there is for strategic voting.  But my concern in this Article is not so much
with issue and outcome vo ting on their own but rather on explanations for the suppression (or
recognition) of the product rule.  If one kind of voting substitutes for the product rule, and there  is
reason not to apply the  product rule directly, then there is a good argument for that voting procedure.
Vote trading might be defended if we thought judges felt most intensely when they were also
most expert or even most confident.  One the other hand, judges might recognize subject matter
expertise in their fellow judges, and defer accordingly.  It seems more likely that trading would elevate
judges’ preferences, which in turn threatens to diminish the (Jury Theorem style) advantage of using
more than one judge -- offset however by the increased chance of bowing to real judicial expertise.
Finally, it is useful to mention the possibility of vote switching by
judges.  Judges might attempt to maximize their power through some
combination of strategic voting and vote trading.67  Two judges might trade
across cases if they feel strongly about different issues, but they might also
trade in order to improve their chances of “victory” on issues regarding
which they are highly certain.  Jurors rarely have these options and, in any
event, the very ideas of preferences and power remind us that we have left
the domain of the Jury Theorem.
IV.  Conclusion
Law often sets out multiple requirements for liability or other results.
These requirements can be questions about facts or about the applicability
of legal rules.  In turn, judges and juries that find facts and law and apply
(or find) law are sometimes uncertain about their judgments and must
therefore combine multiple assessments.  There is no dispute as to how to
combine the chances of arriving at some sequence when flipping a fair coin
multiple times, but this method of combination, known as the product rule,
is remarkably absent from statutory and judicial vocabularies.  Lawmakers
either violate this rule or, more often, obfuscate.  They do not say what they
do and they do not instruct others as to how to combine probabilistic
assessments.  I have referred to this obfuscation or refusal to follow logic as
amounting to a suppression of the product rule and, equivalently, as
presenting the puzzle of the math-law divide.
Roughly speaking, I have suggested that we can in fact explain, or at
least rationalize, law’s suppression of the product rule where multi-member
panels are used – especially when operating with a supermajority decision
rule.  First, the larger the panel and the greater the majority, the more
confident we can be that the aggregate assessment is correct – and indeed
more likely to be correct than any individual non-expert assessment.  This is
a fairly direct application of the Condorcet Jury Theorem.   But this effect on
it own is modest both because the jury and judicial panels we use are not
huge and because it is not always clear when the Jury Theorem’s
assumptions are met.
But there is a second feature of juries and other panels.  It is that
when a panel – and especially one that is unanimous or otherwise
supermajoritarian – finds something to be more likely than not, our best
guess following this panel’s observation is a likelihood much more than that
“more likely than not” decision point.  The idea is that the panel’s
supermajority are likely to be distributed across a range; they may well
have reported the lower end of their group’s assessments or even
something below that because they were simply asked whether the
preponderance-of-the-evidence standard had been met.  And our best
assessment is made by drawing inferences from the assessments of all the
members of the panel.  In short, the product rule might be suppressed
because the multiple assessments point to greater likelihoods than are
reported.  Finally, we do not ask the panel directly to carry out just such
aggregation assessments with precision (followed by an application of the
product rule) because to do so would be to encourage strategic voting.
I have also suggested, though less insistently, that we might turn the
direction of the argument around, aiming to explain not the suppression of
the product rule but the occasional use of supermajority voting rules.  Juries
might use such rules to promote deliberation and other such familiar values,
but they might also do so in order to obviate the need for the product rule.
One problem with this approach is that it requires the claim that most jury
cases present multiple, independent requirements, or assessments.
Finally, there is the interesting comparative question.  Future work may show
that single judges, working without juries, incorporate the product rule in their rulings
where their counterparts suppress the product rule in instructing juries.  If so, the
arguments advanced here will glisten in the comparative light.  After all, my claim has
been that conjunction strategies change in the face of aggregation advantages and
difficulties.  Single judges working alone obviously do not face the problem of
aggregating non-identical assessments or of assessing the applicability of the Jury
Theorem.  But what if there is no evidence in American or foreign jurisdictions that lone
judges combine likelihoods any differently from sizeable juries?  We will have a theory
that might work well enough in its limited domain, but have no real reason for so
limiting its domain.  We might then use the connection between conjunction and
aggregation to help decide when to impose (or when to expect) supermajority voting
rules.
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